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  Abstract
  Over the last few years a remarkable shift has taken place in the 
aid instruments advocated for low-income countries, characterised by a con-
version from project to more programme oriented aid and by the inclusion of 
‘broad-based civil society participation’ as a form of new aid conditionality. 
PRSP constitutes a new framework for policy negotiations with the recipient 
government but also a new set of rules for aid implementation. As most of 
the PRSPs are currently in the early stages of implementation, so far scant 
attention has been directed to monitoring and evaluation and particularly to 
the implications of the PRSP ‘participatory’ rhetoric and ‘programme-based’ 
approach. This paper contributes to this under-exploited ﬁeld of research by 
stocktaking and assessing different aspects of M&E systems for a selected 
number of SSA countries. Findings of our desk study conﬁrm evidence from 
other studies that M&E is among the weaker parts of most of the PRSPs. We 
argue that PRSP with its focus on ‘process conditionality’ functions as a cata-
lyst for change, while its basic philosophy of ‘participation’ and ‘comprehen-
siveness’ puts at the same time unrealistic demands on at best embryonic 
national M&E systems. IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02 • 5
  Résumé
    Depuis  quelques  années  une  véritable  transformation  s’est 
opérée dans les instruments propagés pour l’aide aux pays à faible revenu, 
caractérisée d’une part par la mise en exergue de l’aide programme au détri-
ment de l’aide par projet, et d’autre part par une participation obligatoire de 
la société civile. Le DSRP (document de stratégie de réduction de la pau-
vreté, en anglais PRSP) offre aux bailleurs un nouveau cadre de référence 
pour la conduite des négociations avec les pays bénéﬁciaires, mais implique 
également de nouvelles règles de comportement  pour l’exécution de l’aide. 
Etant donné que la plupart des DSRP sont dans leur première phase de mise 
en œuvre, peu d’attention a été jusqu’ici consacrée au suivi et à l’évaluation, 
et en particulier aux implications du discours ‘participatif’ et ‘axé sur les 
résultats’ du DSRP. Le présent papier se situe dans ce domaine sous-exploité 
de la recherche. Il propose un diagnostic de l’état actuel des systèmes publics 
de suivi et évaluation dans un nombre de pays subsahariens et les analyse 
sous différents angles. Les résultats de notre étude de bureau conﬁrment le 
constat d’autres études comparables que le suivi et l’évaluation sont parmi les 
points les plus faibles de la plupart des DSRP. Nous défendons la thèse que le 
DSRP, avec sa ‘conditionnalité axée sur le processus’ agit comme catalyseur 
de changement, tandis que ses principes de ‘participation’ et d’‘approche glo-
bale’ (en anglais : compréhensive) entraînent des pressions irréalistes sur des 
systèmes nationaux de suivi et d’évaluation au mieux rudimentaires.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02 • 7
1.  Introduction 
    It  is  now  generally  acknowledged  that  a  new  paradigm  has 
emerged on how to provide effective international aid. Since the turn of the 
century, major multilateral and bilateral donors have rallied behind the PRSP 
approach, developed at the end of 1999. PRSP stands for Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper, and constitutes the linchpin of a comprehensive new approach. 
Literally, it refers to a policy document that is produced by the recipient coun-
try, and that replaces similar documents such as the Policy Framework Paper 
that used to be imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on low-income aid-
dependent countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. The PRSP by contrast is country-
produced and hence, at least in principle, country-owned. It addresses macro-
economic policies but it goes beyond and tackles social (poverty, gender, ...), 
environmental and governance issues. Once a PRSP has been given the stamp 
of approval by the donor community, donors use it as the framework for their 
aid activities. Ideally, they now provide most of their funds without earmark-
ing them to particular projects, which used to come with donor management 
and control strings attached. Such projects were the traditional means of by-
passing ineffective governments and reaching the poor. In contrast, under the 
PRSP approach, sectoral and general budget support are now the preferred aid 
instruments. A double diagnostic has led to this considerable shift in donor 
thinking and practice. On the one hand, it was recognized during the 1990s 
that government failures in the recipient country were a major part of the 
explanation of why especially African low-income countries were lagging 
behind in terms of economic growth and human development. If the funda-
mental constraint to development at the national level is not micro and tech-
nical (lack of decent roads or basic health services, inadequate agricultural 
research and extension, etc.) but macro and political (malfunctioning and cor-
rupted public services, political leaders uncommitted to broad-based, sustain-
able human development, lack of transparency in public affairs, voiceless and 
powerless citizens, etc.), then it stands to reason that donors make this a major 
feature of their aid programmes. They can do this by using the inﬂuence that 
aid procures to press for institutional improvements of the public sector and 
of democratic governance or even by shying away from the hopeless cases 
and shifting their aid to governments that have a proven track record in im-
proving public sector governance. On the other hand, it was also recognized 
that donors share a considerable part of the blame for the perceived failure of 
low-income aid-dependent countries. By trying to bypass governments, they 
actually weakened them institutionally in several ways. Providing aid to gov-
ernment, respecting its policy priorities, using its budgeting and allocation 
mechanisms, and using the same government’s control mechanisms, rather 
than imposing those of the donor, is now seen as the more enlightened an-
swer. 
The consequences of the new approach for M&E are huge and daunt-
ing. Under the PRSP approach elaborate systems of donor-managed M&E 
systems linked to donor micro-managed projects are in principle wound up 8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02
and replaced by improved and expanded national M&E systems. This suppos-
es a large degree of trust in the willingness and capacity of the governments 
to bring their national M&E systems in a reasonable time up to internationally 
acceptable standards. In this sense, as in quite a few others, the new PRSP 
approach is a bold leap in the dark. All the more so since it is openly admit-
ted that present national M&E systems are hugely inadequate. Indeed their 
glaring deﬁciency is part of the diagnosis that led to the new approach. In line 
with this, donors are now paying considerable attention to efforts to enhance 
national M&E systems in PRSP countries. Yet for obvious reasons, most of 
them do not readily abandon their own control mechanisms, and thus insist 
on M&E exercises using donor systems. They also create new ones, such 
as joint government-donor public expenditure reviews, expenditure tracking 
case studies, and the like. 
This is the setting for the present paper. Existence of acceptable na-
tional planning, budgeting and M&E systems, or at least observable improve-
ments in such systems, and trust in a recipient country’s policy priorities is in 
principle necessary for the effective and successful move towards aid instru-
ments which are characterised by a shift from donor control to recipient con-
trol and from identiﬁable aid activities to non-identiﬁable aid activities. Trust 
in institutional capability of recipients is extremely important in this respect1. 
Reinforcing public institutional competence is not straightforward, not even 
in industrialised countries. Apart from technical training and administrative 
reform, the management culture must be changed, and so must the way of do-
ing politics. Of course, this is what the PRSP approach is all about, but if one 
looks at it from such close quarters, the challenge is formidable. 
Donors are caught in a chicken-egg dilemma. As long as a minimum 
institutional capacity in terms of design, implementation and evaluation ap-
paratus is not installed and functioning, the move towards new aid instru-
ments which shift more responsibilities to recipients may well be resisted 
by the more conservative donors, while those that go along with the new ap-
proach may still provisionally chose to duplicate the recipient country’s ﬂedg-
ling systems with their own, putting additional demands on recipients that 
go a long way to undermine the whole approach. Donors seem to expect that 
within a not too long period of time an effective M&E system will be in place 
that elaborates a clear policy and performs the functions of accountability and 
improvement of interventions through systematic feedback, and that such a 
system will live up to international standards, including those of independ-
ence and impartiality, credibility, usefulness and feedback, and participation 
of stakeholders. 
Considering how crucial a sound M&E system is to the success of the 
PRSP approach, one is struck by the relative lack of attention that has been 
given to the issue so far, both in Joint Staff Assessments (JSA) and in inde-
pendent reviews. The aim of the present study is to contribute to this under-
exploited ﬁeld of research by stocktaking and assessing different aspects of 
1 There is some similarity with the 
shift  from  project  to  programme 
funding  of  intermediaries  such  as 
NGOs  and  multilateral  agencies 
by ofﬁcial bilateral donors. Such a 
move also requires a level of trust 
in the institutional quality and over-
all  policy  of  such  intermediaries, 
which goes beyond trust in their 
capacity to execute a well-deﬁned 
and  circumscribed  project.  The 
analogy  is  however  not  perfect. 
Trusting  a  technically  competent 
and  development  oriented  mul-
tilateral agency or NGO involves 
much  less  risk  than  trusting  the 
governments and bureaucracies of 
weak and corrupt states.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02 • 9
M&E systems for a selected number of countries. In doing this, we limit 
ourselves in this ﬁrst phase to a desk study on the basis of ofﬁcial PRSP 
documents (PRSP and Annual Progress Reports). 
Section one sets out in more detail the catalysing potential of the 
PRSP and highlights how it inevitably pushes M&E issues to the fore-
front. Before presenting in section three detailed ﬁndings from our own 
desk study we brieﬂy comment upon what has emerged from a few stud-
ies that have focused on the quality of national M&E systems and that, 
similarly to ours, are comparative in nature and based on documentary 
evidence. Section four concludes and qualiﬁes the starting point of our 
paper. While the PRSP certainly may be considered a catalyst for change, 
at the same time, it makes unrealistic demands on at best embryonic na-
tional M&E systems. The PRSP rationale requires M&E systems that are 
‘multi-stakeholder’, ‘multi-purpose’, ‘multi-dimensional’, ‘multi-method’, 
‘multilayer’ and ﬁnally ‘multi-criteria’. Such requirements are challeng-
ing for any M&E system and particularly burdensome for the infant na-
tional M&E systems of most PRSP countries. 
  
2.  PRSP: a catalyst for change  
    As argued in the introduction, the PRSP is used here as a 
label for the new aid architecture. Donors are well aware that minimum 
standards for recipient M&E systems are not satisﬁed at the outset. One 
may consider the PRSP with its emphasis on ‘process conditionality’2 as 
a necessary catalyst for the shift towards new aid instruments: it makes 
the implementation of effective national planning, budgeting and M&E 
systems a conditionality. It thus forces a number of institutional issues 
on the reform agenda whose implementation may well take considerable 
time, but which are deemed crucial for the new aid approach to work 3. 
The list of such issues includes the following:  
i)   Results  and  performance-based  management  and  budget-
ing: more attention to outcomes and to linkages between outcomes and 
inputs. It is to be expected that results-based management (RBM) will 
generate a demand for and a pressure towards M&E. If resource alloca-
tion and planning is on the basis of outcomes then one needs information 
about the outcomes. An illustration is Uganda where line ministries only 
get resources from the donor-sponsored Poverty Action Fund if they can 
prove that outcomes are in line with goals of poverty reduction. Such a 
carrot-and-stick approach obviously generates an incentive for the line 
ministry concerned to collect information on outcomes, but it is equally 
clear that there is a need to cross-check and validate the information thus 
generated. 
2 See Booth (2003) on PRSP philosophy 
of ‘process conditionality’ and the degree 
to which the shift towards this new form 
of  conditionality  has  already  effectively 
been realized.  
3 For country evidence see for instance 
Evans and van Diesen (2002) who in their 
review of Tanzania’s Poverty Monitoring 
System  consider  the  PRSP  process  an 
important catalyst. They state (p. 5) that 
‘without an initiative like the PRSP, it might 
have taken much longer for Tanzania to 
establish  its  poverty  monitoring  system’. 
See also Booth (2003) on the value add-
ed of PRSP for boosting reforms in Kenya, 
Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique.  10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02
ii)  Iterative learning, moving away from blueprint ex-ante planning 
and budgeting towards more ﬂexibility, where results of monitoring and eval-
uation effectively feed into future cycles, one of the most important incentives 
for suppliers of information being that their information will be used. An 
iterative approach is conditional upon the effective functioning of feedback 
mechanisms, so as to disseminate and integrate M&E ﬁndings in the decision-
making process. Moreover the PRSP itself is iterative, in that it is supposed 
to be renewed every three years or so. And the country has to produce annual 
progress reports.
iii)  Evidence-based approach4. This is also clear from the emphasis 
placed on ‘diagnosis’ (expanding the knowledge base). The PRSP has effec-
tively led to an upsurge in data collection, especially on poverty; to a renewed 
interest in particularly household surveys, which has led to a dramatic im-
provement in the availability of survey-based household-consumption data5. 
In order to make the diagnosis informed by the poor themselves, participatory 
techniques are increasingly propagated (see also v). In the diagnostic phase, 
i.e. while preparing the PRSP, most countries have organized some ‘informa-
tional’ Participatory Poverty Assessment. In some cases this initial PPA had 
a mobilising power to organise non-state stakeholders; in some cases it has 
established a working relationship between state and non-state stakeholders, 
which had not been interacting so closely before; it has been copied to some 
extent during the monitoring phase (particularly poverty monitoring); and 
ﬁnally has laid the basis for some degree of institutionalisation. 
iv)   Crucial role for central ministry in charge of the PRSP, typi-
cally the Ministry of Finance or/and Planning. The ambition to put a system 
of RBM into practice, the need for alignment and discipline in budgeting, 
planning and M&E cycles, all point in the same direction. Note that under 
traditional project-funding by donors, line ministries have a large degree of 
freedom in negotiation directly with donors. Under the PRSP logic, they come 
under the tutelage of the Finance or Planning Ministry.
v)  ‘Participatory (inclusive) development agenda’: the PRSP has fos-
tered entry points for participation of a broad range of stakeholders (owner-
ship). This bringing of new actors into the policy process has both techno-
cratic and political connotations. Stakeholders include state actors (central 
ministries; line ministries, although line ministries may well lose autonomy 
compared to the previous aid architecture; national statistical ofﬁce; parlia-
ment; decentralised executive and legislative bodies; implementing agencies) 
and non-state actors (civil society organizations, research institutes, private 
sector). The idea is that non-state stakeholders (and in particular those that di-
rectly represent beneﬁciaries, users of service delivery) can play key roles in 
producing evidence about the implementation and impact of service delivery 
and policy processes (supply of information for the M&E system) as they are 
users themselves or have ‘grassroots’ contacts and are therefore well placed 
4  Evidence-based  approaches  to 
policy making are probably rarities: 
their implicit rational and linear view 
of policy diagnosis, then formulation, 
implementation,  monitoring  and 
evaluation, feeding back into follow-
ing rounds, do not square well with 
political  reality.  Typically,  evidence 
is only a small ingredient in policy 
making (see also Oxfam, 2002). 
5  Razaﬁndrakoto  and  Roubaud 
(2003)  are  rather  sceptical  and 
indicate that given the poor qual-
ity of the usual household surveys, 
the  present  proliferation  of  sur-
veys does not necessarily lead to 
any progress in knowledge about 
poverty  and  appropriate  remedy-
ing policies. IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02 • 11
to channel and represent the voices of the beneﬁciaries. The implicit assump-
tion is that such civil society actors are sufﬁciently ‘representative’ and close 
to the poor so as to act on their behalf. The idea is further that these non-state 
actors exert pressure for more information for accountability reasons and in 
order to improve public service delivery. A problem may arise with this rea-
soning if some of the non-state stakeholders become too closely engaged with 
state M&E systems. Or they themselves may be important service providers. 
This is often the case with local non-governmental development organizations 
(NGOs) that may depend for a considerable part of their funding on providing 
services to the poor on behalf of the state or donors. If donors strengthen non-
state actors in their demand for information and accountability, if in other 
words donors increase the voice of civil society, then this may indirectly lead 
to a strengthening of M&E systems, which is what donors want eventually. If 
from the start a broad range of stakeholders are involved, in particular non-
state actors, they also become aware of the limitations of statistical surveys, 
of the basic criteria (validity) that need to be respected, they better see the 
need for the collection of particular information, while they can also highlight 
what they ﬁnd important themselves.
vi)  Multidimensional approaches to M&E, inspired by a desire to 
devote more attention to qualitative, difﬁcult-to-measure issues. This has 
given impetus to methodological approaches seeking to combine qualitative 
and quantitative methodologies. Note that other terminologies are possible 
for qualitative and quantitative methodologies: conventional and non-conven-
tional are also often used; contextual and non-contextual is used by Booth 
et al. (1998). Qualitative approaches are also mostly linked to participatory 
approaches. Even though qualitative approaches are in practice often auto-
matically labelled ‘participatory approaches’, they are clearly not synonyms. 
The former refers to the generation of ‘subjective data’ and to a methodology 
that differentiates from quantitative research mostly on the basis of the data 
collection and analyses techniques that are used while ‘participatory’ rather 
refers to ‘who participates’ in the monitoring and evaluation (and mostly to 
participation of a broad range of stakeholders, mostly beneﬁciaries). In prac-
tice ‘participatory’ is often used in the very ‘restrictive sense’ of ‘sources of 
information’ and not in the sense of ‘empowerment’, which necessitates a 
much higher degree of participation, also in the ‘grand design’. 
vii)  Donor alignment and harmonisation. These twin notions are 
crucial in the new aid vocabulary. With alignment is meant that donors ac-
cept recipient policy priorities and use recipient systems of implementation 
and control. Alignment thus pertains to the domain of north-south relations. 
With harmonization is meant that donors work together in order to reduce the 
high administrative ‘transaction costs’ their own aid procedures inﬂict on 
recipient governments. Common rules for international competitive procure-
ment or joint evaluation missions are cases in point. This is the domain of 
north-north relations. The relationship between donor alignment and recipi-
ent country institutional capabilities in planning, implementing, monitoring 12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02
and evaluation goes in two directions. Stress on donor harmonisation and 
alignment is conditional upon recipient countries’ institutional capabilities: if 
there are no institutional capabilities, donors will be reluctant to wind down 
their own M&E procedures and may continue to micro-manage projects us-
ing their own systems.  Strengthening and building of a recipient countries’ 
institutional capability also critically depends upon the willingness of donors 
to abandon their own parallel M&E procedures that are very demanding on 
recipient bureaucracies, thus releasing capacities and resources for building 
up of the latter’s institutional apparatus. The remaining multiple donor-driven 
M&E procedures constitute a huge opportunity cost for recipient countries. 
Under the PRSP, there is pressure on donors to harmonise and align even 
if the institutional capacity of the recipient is not yet completely satisfying. 
The important thing is that the institutional capacity of the recipient shows a 
minimum degree of performance, that recipients show a willingness to bring 
about the necessary reforms, and that as a consequence a signiﬁcant increase 
in its performance can be expected over a reasonable period of time. IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02 • 13
3.   A selective literature review 
    Before presenting, in the next section, some ﬁndings from our 
desk review of PRSP and of Annual Progress Reports (APR) of the PRSP, 
we brieﬂy comment on what has come out of similar work on the quality of 
national M&E systems. We have mainly looked at research that, like ours, is 
comparative and based, in part or in full, on documentary evidence. Booth 
and Lucas (2002) in their review of 21 sub-Saharan African PRSP and I-PRSP 
and 19 JSAs include information on the actual situation in ﬁve main areas of 
monitoring activity that they consider important in a PRSP context. Included 
are input monitoring, budget reform and expenditure tracking; monitoring 
of implementation processes and intermediate outputs and outcomes; meas-
urement and assessment of poverty outcomes and impacts; increased access 
to information for PRSP stakeholders; and the use of information for policy 
improvement. Another interesting document is the PRSP Synthesis Note 7 
(June 2003) prepared by the PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project that re-
viewed PRS Monitoring in eight African countries. An overview is provided 
of indicators used and characteristics of M&E systems6. A third reference is 
a 2003 review study of the Participation and Civic Engagement Group of the 
World Bank on Participation in Monitoring and Evaluation of PRSPs; this 
study is limited to participation. Finally we draw on the evaluation of the 
PRSP performed by the independent evaluation departments of the World 
Bank (2004) and the IMF (2004). The general impression that comes out of 
this literature is that M&E gets less attention than it deserves. M&E, but by 
extension also the national systems elaborated for planning, budgeting (and 
particularly linkages among these) are the weaker part of most PRSP and thus 
often described in Joint Staff Assessments as ‘challenging’ or something to 
that effect. 
We structure our comments around ﬁve broad topics: policy, organiza-
tion, capacity, participation, and quality, a categorisation we will also use in 
the next section.
3.1.   Policy 
    There is not much explicit attention in the literature to the ‘grand 
design’ and broad policy of M&E but instead much emphasis on targets and 
indicators. 
The Results Based Approach propagated in the donor discourse may 
partly explain why the identiﬁcation of indicators gets so much attention in 
the M&E sections of PRSPs, to the point of sometimes being the exclusive fo-
cus of attention. The fact that indicators for M&E are identiﬁed is presumably 
considered as positive by donors. In the same vein, targets are usually identi-
ﬁed against which changes in performance on indicators will be assessed. In 
some cases (Uganda and Mauritania) where targets were not achieved, further 
consideration led to the conclusion that they were unrealistic and they were 
subsequently adapted.  Although donors like to see targets that are derived 
from the Millennium Development Goals, accepted by the UN in 2000 (UN, 
2000), recipients seem to be less under the impression. In fact their PRSP 
6 Issues included are key features 
of  system;  details  of  institutional 
framework;  key  outputs  of  the 
system; indication about how indi-
cators  have  been  chosen;  multidi-
mensionality;  general  description 
of  core  set  of  indicators;  realism 
of targets; attention to inputs and 
intermediate  indicators,  and  ﬁnal 
outcomes:  evidence  of  attention 
to  monitoring  chain;  attention  to 
budget reform and public expendi-
ture tracking; data collection instru-
ments  used;  recognition  of  poor 
quality  of  routine/administrative 
data; participatory monitoring; role 
of parliament; attention to sub-na-
tional level; costing the system. 14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02
targets often do not correspond to those of the MDGs (PRSP Synthesis Note 
No. 7, 2003). There may be very good country-speciﬁc reasons not to copy 
the MDG targets and it may be considered a signal of country ownership of 
indicators. But it may lead to duplicating of monitoring efforts later on if do-
nors put additional demands on national statistical systems to get information 
on MDGs.
Identiﬁcation of indicators seems very uneven. For some sectors like 
education and health they appear not selective enough, in the sense that too 
many indicators are retained. It is highly unlikely that large numbers of indi-
cators can actually be monitored by overstretched public systems. For other 
sectors, notably employment and governance, fewer indicators have been 
identiﬁed. This was noted in several JSA of PRSP. An impressionistic review 
of the JSA of Progress Reports suggests that a lot of countries have reacted 
and reﬁned this, some more than others. In most cases however it is not re-
ally clear if all indicators retained are effectively monitored, and what is done 
with the monitoring information collected.  
Booth & Lucas (2002) make the valid point that strong attention on 
inputs and ﬁnal poverty outcomes has led to a ‘missing middle’ in M&E. This 
can be partly blamed on the Results Based Management that donors favour 
(White, 2002). As a consequence, not enough data is collected on intermedi-
ary outcomes. There should be M&E of the overall policy chain. In evalua-
tion terminology, one could say that there is too little consideration for the 
‘operational channels’. This is not surprising as interventions are typically not 
conceptualised on the basis of an explicit program theory, including a proc-
ess theory and an impact theory. From an evaluation theory point of view 
one could say that interventions themselves are not very well conceptualised, 
and thus an issue of ‘evaluability’ arises (Rossi P.H. et al., 2004). If a proper 
program theory had been elaborated, the missing middle of output or inter-
mediate outcome indicators would automatically have come into focus. Booth 
& Lucas (2002) correctly link the diagnosis of a ‘missing middle’ to the need 
for process evaluation. 
Related to the idea that there should be M&E of the overall policy chain, 
Booth and Lucas (2002) argue that Public Expenditure Management (PEM), 
which provides the framework for input monitoring, should be much more 
closely integrated with M&E. More generally, the impression that comes 
across both from the literature and our cursory analysis of PRSPs and related 
documents is that in a lot of cases, indicators are detached from the bigger 
picture. Often it is not clearly indicated how they logically ﬂow from the ob-
jectives set in the PRSP.
Yet such identiﬁcation is necessary to assess the appropriateness of in-
dicators. By themselves, indicators are neither input, output nor outcome in-
dicators; such characteristics derive from the level to which they are attached 
in a logical framework.
The whole M&E design is often methodologically ill thought through. 
All kinds of problems with construct validity and reliability of indicators arise. 
Indicators are used to measure ‘complex constructs’, whose operationalisa-
tion is not straightforward, and often do not address well threats to construct IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02 • 15
validity such as mono-operation bias. Indicators, and in particular qualitative 
indicators, also often suffer from low reliability.  For instance, as Booth and 
Lucas (2002) point out, a blind eye is often turned to the manifest unreliability 
of ofﬁcial reporting systems on which monitoring depends. Such problems 
with data quality are not sufﬁciently taken into account when identifying 
indicators (Razaﬁndrakoto and Roubaud, 2003). On the other hand, avail-
ability of survey-based household-consumption data has improved in many 
PRSP countries. This should assist in monitoring outcomes and impacts. Fur-
thermore a good M&E plan should pay attention to the timeliness of data, it 
should in fact map the various decision making cycles to which M&E data 
should be directed and seek as much congruence with planning and budget-
ing as possible. There is not much evidence that this is the case, and thus the 
risk of underutilised data increases.  
A ﬁnal weakness in M&E policy and design is the conﬂation of the twin 
components of monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation seems very much an 
afterthought, hardly distinguishable from monitoring. Monitoring outcome 
is often equated with evaluation. That one ought to be measuring ‘changes in 
outcome’ rather than levels of outcome, and further control for confounding 
factors to arrive at some measure of  ‘impact’ is hardly ever mentioned. Do-
nors have some responsibility for this. In the World Bank’s PRSP sourcebook 
for instance, monitoring and evaluation are not well distinguished; indeed, 
they are used interchangeably more often than not, as if donors feel that push-
ing beyond monitoring overstretches the capacity of national systems. This 
may well be so but, if only for reasons of intellectual clarity, the two terms 
of the M&E should not be confused. One of the consequences of this leaning 
towards monitoring at the expense of evaluation is that the balance between 
policy feedback and accountability is lost. Whereas monitoring is inherently 
closer to implementation, for evaluation there is also a need for independence 
and impartiality. In all M&E systems the trade-off between independence 
and feedback exists, but in PRSP documents that trade-off is often obfus-
cated. Institutional arrangements do not seem to be driven by these questions 
of how to keep a good balance between independence and feedback. 
The absence of attention for evaluation also means absence of attention 
for the linkage between monitoring and evaluation. If data from monitoring 
is also to be used for evaluation, there is a need to take this into account from 
the start. More speciﬁcally, information on important external factors will 
have to be gathered, and often more disaggregated data need to be collected. 
One casualty of the cursory treatment of evaluation is poverty and social 
impact analysis (PSIA), which is the jargon expression for efforts to trace ex-
ante the possibly harmful effects of trade liberalisation or similar orthodox 
policy measures on the poor. The appeal of PSIA has increased: a high pro-
portion (73%) of PRSP countries indicated over the year 2002-2003 that they 
would apply it (IMF and IDA, 2003g). In reality it seems to be considered as 
something entirely external, performed by donors with little participation of 
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cided by the WB and IMF. In some cases like Uganda and Chad CSOs have 
been consulted in an exercise on the priorities and sequencing of PSIA for 
proposed structural policies (IMF and IDA, 2003g). But PSIA gets hardly any 
attention in sections on M&E; if there is an evaluation plan PSIA is not really 
considered part of it. Consequently there is no guarantee that data collection 
for monitoring does feed into the PSIA. Neither is a feedback mechanism 
elaborated, so that the results of PSIA fail to feed back into national policy 
cycle, a few exceptions like Zambia notwithstanding.  
The neglect of evaluation and the related weakness of accountability 
are of course worrying to donors. They try to compensate in part for this 
by increasing the role of non-state stakeholders who are supposed to act as 
watchdogs, and by organising their own separate evaluations. 
3.2.  Organization
    Where participation has been institutionalised in the M&E sys-
tem, several approaches can be distinguished, ranging from the centralised 
(Uganda) to the decentralised (Tanzania)7.  In both countries the system has 
brought together a broad range of users and providers of information. They 
differ mostly in the degree of power they give to central bodies. They both 
have a Monitoring Steering Committee that exercises central oversight and 
consists of representatives of a broad range of different stakeholders, and an 
ofﬁcial secretariat, located centrally in the Ministry of Finance. The power 
this unit wields is different: in Uganda the unit has a leading role, whereas in 
Tanzania it is one player among several. While the Tanzanian model is more 
open and inclusive for non-state stakeholders, promoting in this way broad-
based ownership, the absence of a centralized system may lead to a vacuum 
of authority and initiative (Evans and Ngalwea, 2001). What is not mentioned 
or speciﬁed in such discussion of institutional arrangements are the complex 
issues related to the relationships between the different providers and users. 
3.3.  Capacity
    This is generally acknowledged as being a major issue. Most 
PRSP countries have weak public sectors in general and very limited human 
resource capacity when it comes to the complex tasks of M&E in particular. 
What expertise there is tends to be dispersed over different organizations 
(Statistical Ofﬁce, Finance Ministry,…). Donors try to close the gap with 
technical assistance, and through institutional strengthening and reforming 
M&E systems, but in the best of cases the results take a long time to mature. 
The overall impression is that there is, and will be for a considerable time 
to come, a formidable mismatch between the demands put on the system by 
donors, and national capacity.
3.4.  Participation
    The poor have been involved in participatory poverty assess-
ments (PPA) during the preparation of PRSPs in a numerous countries. In the 
subsequent phase of implementation, participation typically drops. There are 
7 On the differences between M&E 
system in Uganda and Tanzania see 
among others Evans and Ngalwea 
(2001);  Booth  and  Lucas  (2002); 
PRSP  Synthesis  Note  No.  7.  On 
Uganda’s institutional M&E design in 
particular, see among others Hauge 
(2001); Prennushi et al. (PRSP Sour-
cebook chapter 3, annex C.1.); on 
Tanzania  see  a.o.  Assey  (2001); 
Evans and Ngalwea (2001); Evans 
and van Diesen (2002); Prennushi 
et al. (PRSP Sourcebook chapter 3, 
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some interesting exceptions to this. In Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda 
and Zambia there are cases of ‘second and third generation PPAs’8 that are 
being used for monitoring PRSP and that also show higher degrees of institu-
tionalisation (World Bank, 2003). In their research McGee and Norton (2000), 
and Robb (1999) and Norton (2001) have identiﬁed conditions for PPA to 
become monitoring and policy inﬂuencing instruments (‘from voice to lever-
age’9). These appear to include the creation of linkages with policy research 
institutes which are not only able to collect data, but also to analyse data and 
disseminate them, thus making the results of PPA a body of social knowl-
edge. Ownership of information is not really power, ownership of ‘informa-
tion analysis’ is, and CSOs themselves often have low analytical capabilities. 
Useful are also efforts to embed PPA within ofﬁcial M&E policy, rather than 
just having an odd PPA performed once in a while. 
When participatory monitoring does take place, it is mostly ‘poverty 
monitoring’. This is not surprising, but gradually there are also more cases of 
participatory monitoring of inputs and outputs and intermediate outcomes. For 
each of the levels of indicators, there exist now lists of conventional and more 
participatory data collection techniques. In the case of outcome monitoring, 
conventional household surveys may be combined with participatory poverty 
monitoring. The same goes for output monitoring, where more and more em-
phasis is put on using traditional approaches in combination with participa-
tory service delivery surveys, participatory beneﬁciary assessment, or citizen 
report card systems. Such participatory techniques work best of course where 
services are easy to measure and monitor. There are similar efforts at partici-
patory budgeting and budget analysis techniques, participatory auditing and 
participatory tracking studies of input-output linkages. One critical comment 
here is that most attention in this debate seems to go to technical issues. There 
is much less attention to institutional issues which are nevertheless important, 
as traditional and participatory data collection techniques are mostly applied 
by actors with different institutional backgrounds. How to ensure that the 
output is compatible? In reality data coming out of such disjointed exercises 
is often so disparate that not even triangulation is possible. There is typically 
no overall strategic plan indicating which techniques will be used to generate 
what kind of data; no map on how to integrate both outputs into one system. 
If later on the aim is to aggregate and synthesize there is need to take this 
into account from the start. There are nevertheless cases of good exploitation 
of dual data sources: PPA and conventional techniques have apparently been 
well combined in Uganda and Zambia10.
Participation typically is conceived in an instrumental fashion, as an 
effective way of gathering data and insights. Such participation is mostly lim-
ited to ‘information sharing’ and then mostly in one direction. The poor and 
destitute are recognised as stakeholders, and they deliver information into 
the system, but they, or rather the CSOs that act on their behalf, do not yet 
make demands on the system. Information dissemination from central level 
to CSOs is necessary to enable CSOs to play a role in terms of accountability. 
8  For  an  overview  of  differences 
between ﬁrst and second genera-
tion  Participatory  Poverty Assess-
ments, see Norton (2001). 
9  Norton  (2001,  p.  41)  makes 
a  linkage  with  the  major  World 
Bank initiative ‘Voices of the Poor’, 
which aimed at promoting consul-
tation and voice and he addresses 
the  need  to  evolve  to  leverage 
and  power. This  may  necessitate 
considerable shifts in current PPA 
approaches (conceptual, methodo-
logical, ethical and political).
10  See  Bird  and  Kakande  (2001) 
in Norton (2001) on Uganda; see 
McGee  and  Norton  (2000)  on 
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What is missing here is some institutional automatism to take into account the 
information needs of CSOs, or a move towards a shared control over decision-
making, in the sense that more stakeholders are participating in the elabora-
tion of a ‘grand design’ of an evaluation programme, choosing which indica-
tors to monitor, which data sources to use, and so on (World Bank, 2003). 
However, bringing CSOs closer into the government system of M&E also 
poses the problem of their ‘independence’. This is compounded by the fact 
that CSOs also often play an important role in implementing the very policies 
they are supposed to be critically monitoring and evaluating (Brock, Mc Gee 
and Ssewakiryanga, 2002). This issue is particular valid in countries where 
CSO have to a large degree been integrated in ofﬁcial M&E, such as Uganda 
(Brock, Mc Gee and Ssewakiryanga, 2002)(Wordofa, 2002). 
If quite some attention has been devoted in literature to the participa-
tion of non-state stakeholders, the same is not the case with state stakeholders. 
Line ministries, decentralised authorities and implementing agencies all have 
essential roles to play, particularly in monitoring. Only in some cases, e.g. 
Uganda, have problems of coordination been noted between the PRSP M&E 
institutional set-up and the existing sectoral line-ministry monitoring systems. 
Most attention at these levels has been for the improvement of the quality of 
the existing Management Information Systems (MIS). Some M&E systems 
have tried to inverse the standard approach: they did not wait for information 
to come from local level to centre, but instead any available information from 
the centre was communicated to the local level, so that the latter was enticed 
to ﬁll in information gaps or to react to information it considered incorrect.
3.5.  Quality
    The World Bank’s 2004 PRSP evaluation study concludes that 
the PRSP “has spurred sustained interest in enhancing institutional capacity” 
in M&E at the national level (World Bank (OED) 2004: 16). Gradually, more 
and more countries get donor support to address the constraints in national 
systems. This is among others the case for Gambia, Guyana, Guinea, Rwanda 
and Yemen. The same World Bank study includes the results of a survey 
among almost 800 stakeholders in 10 PRSP countries, which reveals that out 
of 39 questions the one on M&E received the most negative response (World 
Bank (OED) 2004: 66, table D). In fact, to the question ‘An effective structure 
to monitor and evaluate results has been established’, 41% of the correspond-
ents answered with ‘Disagree’ or ‘Disagree completely’, whereas a further 
21% answered ‘Don’t know or unsure’.  
As we will illustrate in more detail in the next section, not much seems 
to be done with the indicators once they have been collected. In the Annual 
Progress Reports, there is in general a dearth of analysis of why certain tar-
gets were not met, or recommendations on how to improve performance in 
these ﬁelds.
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  4.  A documentary review of PRSPs and
  Annual Progress Reports (APRs)
    In what follows we present the conclusions of our own desk re-
view of a number of PRSPs and Annual Progress Reports (APR) on the PRSP. 
In recognition of the fact that the PRSP approach is a process approach, and 
that therefore an initial assessment that is exclusively based upon a ﬁrst PRSP 
may fail to capture the dynamics over time, we focus on those countries that 
have already produced at least one APR. APRs are normally written on the 
basis of monitoring information, and in it countries must provide information 
on progress in achieving targets and on improvements in the M&E system. 
We limit our attention geographically to the countries of Sub-Sahara Africa, 
the region where most of the PRSP countries are situated, and thus exclude 
a few countries in Eastern Europe (Albania, Kyrz Republic), Asia (Vietnam) 
and Latin America (Honduras, Nicaragua) that also had produced one or 
more APR at the time of our research (July 2004). Within the African coun-
tries retained there is considerable variation, but we assume that they share 
certain common political and institutional characteristics that will inﬂuence 
the chances of success of national M&E systems. The eleven countries stud-
ied, in alphabetical order, are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. We assess 
them on the basis of a questionnaire consisting of 23 questions relating to 
M&E. The full list of questions is reproduced in annex 1. We regroup the 
questions under ﬁve headings: policy, organization, capacity, participation, 
and quality. The same categories were used in the previous section in our 
brief literature review. The main results are presented in table 1. We use a four 
point scoring system: weak, partially satisfactory, satisfactory and excellent. 
In the columns under the scores, we list the number of countries that we as-
signed this score for every question. We then arbitrarily assigned numerical 
values from 1 to 4 to the scores, and on this basis calculated an average index 
per question in the last but one column. In the last column we give the rank 
order for every question on the basis of the average score.  In what follows 
we ﬁrst provide a detailed set of comments per question, and then move to a 
more general analysis of our ﬁndings. The scores are based on the informa-
tion we found in the ofﬁcial documents (PRSP, APR). We also looked at the 
Joint Staff Assessments (JSA) of those documents produced by staff at the 
World Bank and the IMF. However, we found that the JSA were in general not 
very detailed on the issue of M&E and thus not very helpful. Often only a few 
bland general comments were made, of the “some progress has been made 
but much remains to be done” variety. In the few cases where the JSA contain 
more incisive comments, we will refer to it in the text. However, the scores we 
attached were not based on the JSA. We used our own best judgement, on the 
basis of the information produced in the ofﬁcial documents. In this ﬁrst stage 
of the research we deliberately limited the information base for all countries 
to the same set of ofﬁcial PRSP documents. This necessarily means that for 
some of the countries (like Uganda and Tanzania) we disregarded other addi-
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performance in M&E and which may nuance some of our ﬁndings. This ﬁrst 
stage aims to provide an overall diagnosis and to identify a number of key-is-
sues, which may merit particular attention. It is the basis for future in-depth 
analysis in a selected number of countries. 
Table 1:   M&E scores for 11 Sub-Saharan African countries












  I. Policy             
1 The evaluation plan 3 6 2 0 1.91 13
2 M versus E 4 3 4 0 2.00 10
3 Selection of indicators  0  3 7 1 2.82  3
4 Selection criteria  2 1 4 4 2.91  2
5 Priority setting  2 5 3 1 2.27  6
6 Causality chain  3 8 0 0 1.73 16
7 Methodologies used  1 4 4 2 2.64  5
8 Data collection  3 3 4 1 2.27  6
9 Autonomy & impartiality 6 4 1 0 1.55 19
10 Feedback 4 2 5 0 2.09  9
11 Alignment planning & 
budgeting
7 3 1 0 1.45 22
  II. Organization        
12 Coordination & oversight 5 3 2 1 1.91 13
13 Statistical Ofﬁce 3 3 4 1 2.27  6
14 Line Ministries 1 9 1 0 2.00 10
15 Decentralized levels 5 6 0 0 1.55 19
16 Link with projects 7 4 0 0 1.36 23
  III. Capacity            
17 Problem acknowledged 0 2 7 2 3.00  1
18 Capacity building plan 0 5 4 2 2.73  4
  IV. Participation of actors 
outside government 
           
19 Parliament 7 1 3 0 1.64 17
20 Civil Society 4 3 4 0 2.00 10
21 Donors 5 6 0 0 1.55 19
  V. Quality (on the basis of 
Annual Progress Reports) 
           
22 Effective use of M&E in APR 5 5 1 0 1.64 17
23 Internal usage of APR 4 5 2 0 1.82 15
Source: authors’ desk review
In what follows we offer a more detailed discussion per question, re-
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4.1.   Policy 
    1.  The evaluation plan: score 1.91, rank 13 our of 23
    Most documents contain some elements of an evaluation plan, 
but seldom are the cases where all the major issues are being addressed.
    2.  M versus E:  score 2.00, rank 10 out of 23
      In all countries there is an unbalanced emphasis on monitor-
ing. Some countries (Niger, Mauritania, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso) do not 
even mention that one of the possible functions of monitoring is to feed into 
evaluation. While four countries (Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, Ghana) 
explicitly differentiate and elaborate on differences between monitoring and 
evaluation, indicating their different objectives, instruments used (see e.g. 
Mozambique and Ghana), none of the eleven countries really elaborate in 
depth on the institutional implications. The issue of whether to put monitor-
ing and evaluation together into one unit, and where to put the M&E unit is 
for instance hardly touched upon. Emphasis on monitoring might for instance 
involve a different institutional location than emphasis on evaluation. The 
emphasis on monitoring, and the neglect of evaluation is also clear from the 
meagre attention that is given to the importance of autonomy and impartiality 
(see also question 9). 
    3.  Selection of indicators: score 2.82, rank 3 out of 23
      While there are differences in the quality and coverage, all 
countries have elaborated lists of indicators. Even more encouragingly, in 
countries that already produced more than one APR, the list gets more re-
ﬁned from progress report to progress report. Most countries are stronger on 
indicators related to social development such as education and health, and 
weaker on productive economic development. The identiﬁcation of interme-
diate output indicators is often a problem. What is much more problematic is 
linking different levels of indicators into one causal chain (on importance of 
causal chain, see also question 6)11. In countries where donors jointly support 
a whole sector through for instance sector budget support or basket funding 
(in the aid jargon labelled SWAPs: sector wide approaches), the quality of 
indicators developed in those sectors tends to be higher than elsewhere (e.g. 
Mozambique). 
    4.  Selection criteria: score  2.91, rank 2 out of 23
      Criteria of selection of indicators are mostly well developed 
and documents give adequate information on who has selected the indicators. 
Criteria of selection of indicators have extensively been discussed in the PRSP 
documents of Tanzania, Ethiopia, Ghana and Mali. 
    5.  Priority setting: score 2.27, rank 6 out of 23
      There is an evolution over time in most countries: in the ini-
tial PRSP not much priority setting was visible, but most countries have re-
11 Similar assessments may be found 
in among others Booth and Lucas 
(2002); PRSP Synthesis Notes No. 
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ﬁned the list of indicators over time. See e.g. Tanzania that in a ﬁrst round had 
chosen indicators on the basis of broad consultation. Subsequently a Techni-
cal Working Group reﬁned the list of indicators. 
    6.  Causality chain: score 1.73, rank 16 out of 23
      In none of the countries are the different levels of indicators 
(input-output-outcome-impact) explicitly linked to each other. In most cases 
there is an emphasis on input and output, and much less attention on outcome 
and impact. In some countries (Mauritania) the need to draw this causal chain 
and to focus on the linkages between different levels in the chain is nowhere 
mentioned. This weakness is conﬁrmed by the assessment in JSA: the JSA of 
the Burkina Faso’s latest progress report indicates that not much analysis has 
been done on linkages between inputs, outputs and outcomes. In other coun-
tries, like Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania the importance is clearly understood, 
but still much effort is needed to put this into practice. The JSA of Uganda’s 
third progress report for instance indicates that more action is needed regard-
ing the identiﬁcation of the causal chain of indicators (even if the Poverty 
Monitoring and Evaluation System explicitly states that it will be concerned 
with the whole chain, clearly more action is needed). Similar comments to the 
effect that there is a need to move further up the chain to the impact cause-ef-
fect theory are contained in the JSA of Tanzania’s second progress report.  
The lack of causality chain, and more fundamentally the deﬁcient spec-
iﬁcation of a program theory on which interventions are based, has obvious 
implications for the analysis of the achievement or non-achievement of targets 
in the progress report (see later: question 22).  Not surprisingly, if no prior 
theory can be referred to that makes clear which prior actions were expected 
to produce which results and why, it becomes difﬁcult at the time of reporting 
to make much sense of the results. 
    7  Methodologies used: score 2.64, rank 5 out of 23
      All countries, except Mali, identify, to varying degrees of 
detail, methodologies that will be used for M&E. In most countries, there is 
more emphasis on quantitative than on qualitative methodologies. What is 
spelled out less clearly is how to integrate such different methodologies. Yet 
there are hopeful exceptions. Ethiopia and Uganda have apparently exten-
sively reﬂected on issues related to the integration of different methodologies. 
Ethiopia has devoted particular attention to methodological issues, such as the 
need to standardize different methodologies, and the need for harmonization 
of indicator systems. Uganda for its part has focused on more managerial and 
organizational issues. In Uganda different roles have been assigned to quan-
titative and qualitative methodologies, with surveys inﬂuencing the choice 
of areas for participatory poverty assessment, a feature that will increase the 
usefulness of PPA for policy-making. In the same country a lot of effort has 
been devoted to integrate data from different sources into one single database. 
Efforts are also documented for joint reporting of information from different 
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ﬁcial M&E, with apparent close interaction between national statistical ofﬁce 
and researchers responsible for participatory monitoring, and a fair degree of 
institutionalization of such participatory monitoring. 
    8  Data collection: score 2.27, rank 6 out of 23
      Most countries identify sources of data collection well. The 
linkage between indicators and sources of data collection (the horizontal log-
ic) is however less often well explained. In countries where there is a SWAP 
approach in at some sectors, like in Mozambique for health and education, 
the linkage of indicators to sources of data collection is remarkably better in 
those sectors. 
    9.  Autonomy and impartiality: score 1.55, rank 19 out of 23
      The need for autonomy and impartiality is a particularly ne-
glected issue. What this suggests is weak accountability for outputs, outcomes 
and impact. This goes beyond accountability for ﬁnancial inputs, the latter 
being taken care of through the PEM. More than half of the PRSP documents 
do not even mention the issue. Only in the case of Uganda, accountability is 
mentioned as one of the important aims of an M&E strategy. Whereas some 
countries, like Malawi, refer to the need for external monitoring and evalua-
tion by CSOs, it seems that it is only effectively applied in Uganda where the 
Uganda Debt Network has developed Poverty Action Fund Monitoring Com-
mittees, which provide alternative information on expenditure matching com-
mitments12. The ﬁndings are also integrated into the progress report, which is 
indicative of the fact that in Uganda the government explicitly acknowledges 
the important role of independent monitoring. 
    10. Feedback: score 2.09, rank 9 out of 23
      While most of the countries, except for Niger, Mauritania, 
Zambia and Mali, seemingly put a lot of efforts in systematic reporting and 
dissemination, effective integration of M&E results remains most of the time 
problematic. There are some exceptions (Mozambique and Uganda) were ef-
forts are undertaken to establish feedback loops and increase the probability 
of effective integration. Even in these countries the reader is left with serious 
doubts about their effective functioning. 
    11. Alignment of planning and budgeting: score 1.45,
      rank 22 out of 23
      Alignment with planning and budgeting seems to be one of 
the most problematic issues. In more than half of the countries, an institu-
tional mechanism has not been established so far. In some countries, like 
Tanzania the current degree of alignment is still weak, but at least the issue is 
on the agenda (the PRSP indicates that a linkage will be established through 
the Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) and the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF)). Some countries, like Ghana, Uganda and Mozambique 
are doing efforts. Ghana is currently working on the elaboration of a nation-
al expenditure tracking system (NETS) that will serve as a useful linkage 
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between monitoring and the MTEF. The JSA of the Ghana progress report 
mentions that there is an improvement between the correspondence of PRSP 
priorities and spending allocations in the budget 2004 by drawing on the 
PRSP M&E structures at the time of budget preparation. Of all the countries 
reviewed, Mozambique seems to have made most progress: the PARPA (Mo-
zambique’s PRSP) is considered to be a medium term programming tool, it 
is well integrated in the national planning system and there are linkages be-
tween existing government monitoring procedures of annual PES (Economic 
and Social Plan) and PARPA key indicators. 
4.2.  Organization 
    12. Coordination and oversight13: score 1.91,
      rank 13 out of 23
      Coordination and oversight are essential. Given the compre-
hensive nature of M&E in the context of the PRSP, different actors are in-
volved in data collection, analysis and feedback (statistical agency, line min-
istries, decentralized levels, central ministries). In most cases these actors 
had already been assigned roles in national M&E. For obvious reasons it is 
important to clarify whether the roles and responsibilities for M&E in the 
context of PRSP are additional or not. Alignment between pre-existing M&E 
systems, however rudimentary, and the new PRSP generated ones is of para-
mount importance. This issue of overlapping responsibilities is mentioned 
in the JSA of the Ghana PRSP where it is stated that further clariﬁcation is 
needed to create an unambiguous division of labour between agencies and 
ministries involved.  
In almost half of the countries there is no well-established, clear insti-
tutional structure for coordination, support, oversight or feedback. As far as 
coordination is concerned, the absence of a clear institutional structure is not 
surprising given the absence of an overall M&E design. Sometimes, like in 
Zambia, the institutional arrangements for coordination are clear but not yet 
operational (the JSA indicates that institutional arrangements are clear but not 
yet operational and that coordination has been weak in the past). 
In most countries where there is a committee for coordination and 
oversight, it is located in the central ministry of Finance and Economic De-
velopment. At best there is room for participation of representatives of line 
ministries (less of decentralized levels), with much less institutionalized par-
ticipation at this level of non-state stakeholders (see also question 20). If non-
state actors are involved, it is mostly in technical working groups (Ghana, 
Malawi). Where there is room for participation of a wider range of stakehold-
ers this increases the complexity of the system (and probably also its func-
tioning, although this is not clear at this moment). Tanzania for instance is 
one of the only countries where the institutional set-up provides a framework 
for broad-based participation of different state and non-state actors, but as 
indicated in the previous section, opinions diverge on whether this somewhat 
loose, less centralized system can actually work. 
13  A  general  remark  concerning 
the six questions under the head-
ing “organization” is that not in a 
single  case  a  clear  organizational 
structure  had  been  proposed  in 
the PRSP, even in a country like Tan-
zania where later on a fairly strong 
monitoring system did emerge. In 
some countries the organizational 
set-up was only elaborated at the 
time  of  the  ﬁrst  progress  report, 
in a lot of others it was not yet 
fully operational at the time of the 
ﬁrst progress report. On the basis 
of this desk study, we cannot give 
meaningful comments on the func-
tioning (quality) of the organization-
al set-up that did emerge, except 
where the topic is discussed in one 
of the documents we consulted. In 
Uganda  for  instance,  where  the 
M&E  structure  is  well  elaborated, 
the JSA of the second progress re-
port notes that M&E needs better 
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  13.  Statistical ofﬁce: score 2.27, rank 6 out of 23
    While in most countries, the role of the statistical ofﬁce is more 
or less clear, streamlining existing surveys to the needs of the M&E system 
is less obvious. Ethiopia is the country that has best documented the role of 
the central statistical authority in the M&E system and where serious efforts 
seem to have been produced to streamline existing surveys into the needs of 
the M&E system. Niger on the other hand comes out of our readings as one of 
the weakest, and the JSA of the APR seems to conﬁrm this when it notes that 
a statistical master plan is needed.
  14.  Line ministries: score 2.00, rank 10 out of 23
    In most countries there are sector monitoring systems at line 
ministry level. However these are mostly of very doubtful quality. Linking up 
such sector units to the central unit is mostly only partially satisfactory and 
should be one of the major issues on the reform agenda almost everywhere. 
  15.  Decentralized level: score 1.55, rank 19 out of 23
    Decentralized M&E systems are problematic everywhere. In a 
few countries like Tanzania and Ghana local government M&E systems at 
least existed prior to PRSP, even if quality was problematic. In most other 
countries this stage had not even been reached. Even worse is the integration 
of proposed or existing local efforts into a global national M&E system. APRs 
for Tanzania and Ghana mention that capacity at local level is low, that the 
linkage between decentralized and central level is problematic. In Tanzania 
the problems are reportedly addressed through sensitization on the poverty 
monitoring system at the local level, with a focus on the roles of local authori-
ties in data collection, processing and analysis. The JSA of the Ghana PRSP 
indicates that integration of district level planning and data collection into the 
PRS process will pose considerable organizational challenges. Many other 
country reports do not mention the problematic nature of linkages, nor do 
they indicate the importance of good functioning two-way information ﬂows. 
In Ethiopia and Malawi the need for local authorities to analyze data and use 
it at the local level is recognized. The need for vertical integration of M&E 
between local and central levels is equally acknowledged, but it is not made 
clear how this should be done. When in other country documents these issues 
are at all addressed, the focus is on getting local authorities to collect infor-
mation and feed it to the national level. That there is also need for a reverse 
information stream and for analysis and feedback into local decision-making 
seems to go unnoticed. 
  16.  Link with projects: score 1.36, rank 23 out of 23.
    This  question  on  efforts  to  relay  with/coordinate  with  donor 
M&E mechanisms scores worse than any other in the list.  In none of the elev-
en countries is the coordination with donor M&E mechanisms for projects 
satisfactory, and in seven countries it is weak. Issue of harmonization and 
alignment of donors is hardly touched upon in PRSP documents. There is in 
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in view of the fact that donors dominate the M&E scene with their uncoordi-
nated efforts to collect and analyze data on their own projects (see also ques-
tion 21). 
There are however some broad references to the twin issues of donor 
alignment and harmonization in some reports. In Burkina Faso an experi-
mental (pilot) approach to development assistance was adopted in Burkina 
Faso in 1997, involving a wide range of donors. Known as the ‘Conditionality 
Reformulation Test Exercise’, it was coordinated by the EC14. The idea was 
for donors to reach a consensus on a series of performance indicators for key 
sectors of government activities. Those indicators would then be used as the 
basis for decisions regarding disbursement of ﬁnancial assistance, whether 
grants or soft loans, preferably in the form of budget support. The document 
mentions that, while the experiment is fairly far advanced, it had not yet led 
to the identiﬁcation of performance indicators validated by the donor com-
munity.  In Zambia, the newly created Planning and Economic Management 
Department (PEMD) in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning will 
be the focal point for overall policy planning, coordination and monitoring, 
including the harmonization of external ﬁnancing and TA. And in Uganda, 
the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit of the Ministry of Finance, Plan-
ning and Economic Development is not only the locus of coordination of na-
tional efforts, but also of coordination with the World Bank. It should be 
added that the documents we studied are not the best source for information 
on donor alignment and harmonization, and we are aware that some inter-
esting efforts are going on. But on the speciﬁc and highly relevant issue of 
integrating with parallel project M&E systems driven by donors, the reports 
should have something to say, and we interpret the silence as testimony to the 
fact that not much is being done.
4.3.  Capacity 
    17. Capacity problem acknowledged: score 3.00,
      rank 1 out of 23
      All countries, with varying degrees of detail, acknowledge 
weaknesses in terms of human, ﬁnancial, institutional capacity. Weaknesses 
regarding human and ﬁnancial weaknesses are better deﬁned than those re-
garding institutional capacity. In particular the linking of disparate M&E ef-
forts in different parts of government, with all its organizational implications 
is not given due attention. The most frank assessment comes from Mali. The 
PRSP and ARP describe M&E as being in an ‘infant stage’, and talk of the 
need for a ‘revolution’ in M&E. 
    18. Capacity building plan: score 2.73, rank 4 out of 23
      Plans for remediation seem well elaborated in half of the cas-
es, sometimes with rich detail.  In Malawi, for instance, there is a technical 
task force that has ﬁnalized a PRSP monitoring and evaluation master plan to 
address problems and an excellent overview table with remediation activities 
14 See Adam et al. (2004) for more 
detailed  information  on  the  Con-
ditionality  Reformulation  Test  Ex-
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is presented. At the other end of the scale, the JSA of Niger’s APR indicates 
that the plan should go further than training, and in particular that civil serv-
ice management reforms are needed, echoing the need for deep institutional 
reform that we identiﬁed throughout our own desk study. 
4.4.  Participation 
    19. Participation by parliament: score 1.64,
      rank 17 out of 23
      Revealingly, the role of parliament is not even mentioned in 
half of the cases. In three countries however, the role of parliament is properly 
recognized, and there is adequate alignment with parliamentary control and 
oversight procedures. In Mozambique for instance parliament has been given 
competence to call ministers before parliament to report on progress of the 
PARPA. Also key indicators of PARPA are integrated in a regular system of 
quarterly and annual government reports to parliament. In Ghana parliament 
receives monthly reports, parliamentary sub-committees members partici-
pate in the M&E Technical Committee, and a parliamentary committee on 
PRSP implementation, monitoring and evaluation has been set up. In Uganda 
parliament has a central oversight function, including over the Steering Com-
mittee that follows up on World Bank policy lending to the PRSP. 
    20. Participation by civil society: score 2.00,
      rank 10 out of 23
      In most of the countries studied there is a token of civil so-
ciety participation in M&E, but this role is not institutionalized and remains 
very much ad-hoc. Sometimes CSOs were invited as members of working 
groups to establish monitoring indicators, but this typically did not automati-
cally mean continued participation. This is an area where the JSAs tend to be 
more outspoken, as civil society participation is for donors a crucial charac-
teristic of the PRSP approach. For instance the JSA of Ethiopia PRSP notes 
that although CSO participation at local and sector level seems well organ-
ized, such is not the case at the central level. As a consequence, civil society 
was not around the table when the M&E system was being designed and put 
in operation. Some reports, notably Malawi and Uganda, point at the possible 
role for civil society outside the ofﬁcial M&E system, that is, as ‘independent’ 
watchdogs. This function seems to have been best developed in Uganda.  
    21. Participation of donors:  score 1.55, rank 19 out of 23
      It proved difﬁcult to assess this question on the basis of the 
PRSP and APR documents we studied, and this highlights the limitations of 
a desk review. While the importance of participation of civil society is given 
some prominence in most PRSP documents, the same is not true for donors, 
and there is little mention of a formal structure for donor involvement.  This 
does however not mean that they are not around the table. They are mentioned 
among several other stakeholders that participate e.g. in the elaboration of the 
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case of Tanzania, there was even a joint-donor statement added to the progress 
report. If anything, the weight of donors in national decision-making in PRSP 
countries, most of which are highly aid dependent, is too large rather than too 
small. The point we wanted to investigate is whether the dominant position of 
donors is acknowledged and translated in their participation in national M&E 
systems. Because if this is not the case, there is a high probability that they 
exert their inﬂuence in parallel, often informal ways. Unfortunately, the issue 
of clear structure for participation of donors in M&E does not really seem to 
be a topic discussed in PRSP documents.  
4.5.  Quality 
    22. Effective use of M&E in progress report: score 1.64,
      rank 17 out of 23
      We were struck by the limited use of M&E results. The APRs 
are mostly of low quality as regards follow-up of performance, and particu-
larly as regards analysis. In most cases, there was no baseline data at the 
time of the full PRSP, and the APR often is the occasion to ﬁll in some of 
the gaps in this respect. When more than one progress report had already 
been produced, we saw progress in the efforts to compare actual performance 
with baseline data and targets, but stopping short of offering an analysis for 
the non-achievement of targets. The difference between changes in indica-
tors and impact is for instance seldom touched upon. The best we could ﬁnd 
in this respect concerns Uganda. The JSA of the ﬁrst Ugandan progress re-
port indicates that importance of exogenous factors was understood, but that 
more analysis was needed to understand to what extent the observed increase 
in inequality was due to structural factors or exogenous events. The second 
progress report scores better in this respect. For most other countries, JSA of 
progress reports mention the absence of analysis as one of the major short-
comings. 
    23. Internal usage of progress report: score 1.82,
      rank 15 out of 23
      The APRs are imposed by donors as a way to keep the pres-
sure on recipient governments. This has had some positive effects, as the pre-
vious discussion has illustrated. For instance, it provided an external impetus 
for renewed broad-based consultation and participation.  APRs also revealed 
the limitations in the current M&E system. In Mozambique it became clear 
that linkages with line ministries were weak, in Burkina Faso that the system 
did not function properly, in Malawi that no workable monitoring framework 
had been established, in Mali that the technical committees which were the 
core of the system saw their responsibilities taken over by the PRSP coordina-
tion unit. On the down side, the compulsory production of an APR may lead 
to external accountability taking precedence over internal accountability. It 
is also a very time-consuming exercise that may have detracted some of the 
best experts from actually improving the system. Whatever the case may be, 
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internal accountability or feedback. Uganda and Mozambique are doing more 
efforts than others. In Uganda the APR is a summary of the poverty status 
report, which is also used for internal purposes, as a mechanism for dissemi-
nation of information and increase of ownership among stakeholders, and it is 
also submitted to parliament. But even here the JSA of the second APR com-
ments that additional work is needed.  
This ends our review of the 23 questions. As a further piece of infor-
mation, we provide in table 2 a comparison of the overall M&E score of the 
eleven countries studied, calculated as the average over the 23 questions used 
in our desk study and thus again solely based on information the countries 
reported themselves in ofﬁcial PRSP documents (PRSP + APR). Differences 
in performance among individual countries were repeatedly noted on the pre-
vious pages. The table reveals that some countries outperform others fairly 
systematically. 
Table 2:  Average M&E scores of 11 Sub-Saharan African countries
  weak  partially 
satisfactory 
satisfactory excellent index 
(1-4)
Uganda  0 7 14 2 2.78
Tanzania  3 7 9 4 2.61
Ghana 2 12 8 1 2.35
Mozambique  4 9 10 0 2.26
Ethiopia 6 9 5 3 2.22
Malawi 4 13 4 2 2.17
Zambia  7 11 5 0 1.91
Mali  12 7 1 3 1.78
Burkina Faso 11 8 4 0 1.70
Mauritania  15 6 2 0 1.43
Niger  16 6 1 0 1.35
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5.  Conclusion: too many challenges at once
  for M&E? 
    Donors may be justiﬁed in their hope that the PRSP process will 
act as a catalyst for institutional reform, yet the upgrading of at best embryon-
ic national M&E systems to an acceptable level constitutes an enormous chal-
lenge. By way of conclusion, we summarize the major issues involved. The 
PRSP process, because of its comprehensive and holistic approach, requires 
M&E systems that are multi-stakeholder; multi-purpose; multi-dimensional 
and multi-method; multi-layer; and ﬁnally multi-criteria. The corresponding 
system requirements are daunting, alone and in combination. Some of the 
challenges are methodological; many others are organizational and institu-
tional.
    i)  Multi-stakeholder M&E 
    •  A ﬁrst group of stakeholders are the different state actors 
involved. Their multiplicity in itself raises questions about “centralisation” 
versus “autonomy” and the desired degree of interaction. The increasing im-
portance put upon the central ministries (Prime Minister Ofﬁce, Presidency, 
Ministry of Finance and /or Planning) raises questions concerning the exact 
role of line ministries. Line ministries should play important roles in espe-
cially monitoring of input, output and outcomes while tasks of evaluation 
may be shared with the central level. To what degree are existing M&E units 
in line ministries integrated into the PRSP M&E system? To what extent are 
line ministries involved in the grand design, so that they also feel ‘ownership’ 
and show a sufﬁcient level of commitment?
    •  The other group are non-state actors. How should the par-
ticipation of non-state actors as CSOs and research institutes be organised: 
where and how, mainstreamed in ministries or separate cells? How about the 
organization of the two-way ﬂow of information: the input of information of 
the CSOs into the national system and the output of the system to non-state 
actors? More speciﬁc questions also come to mind: how to render the input 
from CSO genuinely useful; how to organize the system so as to take into ac-
count the information needs from non-state actors; and how best to feed back 
the information to the demanders of information?
    •  The role of parliament is also a much neglected issue. Par-
liament should play an essential role, particularly as regards accountability. 
Donors have not been very attentive in this respect, not to say that they have 
largely neglected this important dimension. 
    •  And what about the role of donors? To what extent does the 
M&E system take into account information needs of donors? If these are not 
taken into account, they will somehow elaborate their own systems or they 
will impose additional separate demands on national M&E systems. To what 
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ditional demands on the M&E?  To what extent are APR also used for national 
purposes, i.e. for government decision-making processes, or as accountability 
instruments in hands of CSO? To what extent is APR consistent with national 
reporting? To what extent are donors involved in the elaboration of the grand 
design (participation may increase the probability that they align their infor-
mation needs to those of other stakeholders)?  If donors do not as yet make 
full use of the new M&E systems, what is the degree of coordination between 
their own systems and the new systems? 
A general (institutional) problem with the involvement of non-state 
stakeholders is to ﬁnd a level of integration that allows for effective feedback 
but that does not endanger the needed independence of those actors so as to 
ensure accountability.  
  ii)  With multi-purpose M&E we mean the twin functions of feed-
back and accountability. How is the trade-off dealt with institutionally? What 
about the location of the M&E unit: close to operational level (positive for 
feedback, but negative for independence), or far from operational and imple-
mentation level (negative for feedback, positive for independence)? To what 
extent is senior management committed and involved? Is there an independ-
ent budget? To whom does the M&E unit report? Are there explicit mecha-
nisms to ensure feedback? 
iii)  Under the heading of multi-dimensional and multi-method 
M&E questions arise about the integration of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies. Quite some research has been undertaken on methodological 
issues, more particularly the elaboration of more participatory, often more 
qualitative, techniques and how to combine them with quantitative, more con-
ventional techniques. Much of this research precedes the PRSP context (Car-
valho and White, 1997)(Baker, 2000), but is highly relevant to it. For every 
one of the four indicator levels (inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact), there 
now exist conventional and more participatory data collection techniques. 
Much less energy has been devoted to studying the institutional issues of 
multi-dimensional and multi-method M&E. How for instance to design and 
organize conventional surveys and all kinds of more participatory assess-
ments in ways that make their output mutually compatible? In reality data sets 
are often so incongruous that it is not even possible to use one to perform a 
triangulation test on another. And does an overall strategic plan exist indicat-
ing which techniques will be used to generate what kind of data? Discussion 
of institutional issues along these lines is all the more important in view of 
the fact that quantitative and qualitative methodologies are mostly applied by 
different actors belonging to institutionally diverse settings.
iv)  The existence, side by side, of multi-layer, in particular central-
ized versus decentralized M&E, raises questions regarding the degree of ver-
tical integration. Monitoring should normally take place as close as possible 
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M&E system? There are further questions about the scaling up of micro to 
macro, about collecting information at a micro-level, which may also be used 
at a meso and macro level. All this necessitates a clear vision, a plan about 
what information, analysis is needed at different levels and what information, 
analysis should be provided by different levels. 
v)  Multi-criteria M&E is illustrated by the juxtaposition of on the 
one hand process evaluation with criteria as effectiveness and effectiveness of 
implementation and on the other hand impact evaluation.  There is perhaps a 
welcome move away from inputs towards outcome, but insufﬁcient attention 
for changes in outcome, and even less for net impact and attribution. This is 
linked to the shift in attention from evaluation to monitoring15. The shift in 
emphasis towards monitoring also has implications for the trade-off between 
accountability and feedback, as it tilts the balance towards feedback. This 
may not satisfy all donors, and as a consequence some donors may well keep 
on using their own systems for a long time to come, thus weakening still frag-
ile national systems. 
In addition to the ﬁve ‘multi’ issues just discussed, the timeframe that 
donors use under the PRSP approach may also prove problematic. As donors 
are pressed to switch to non-project aid instruments, they devote some aid 
resources to beef up the national M&E systems that must generate the justi-
ﬁcations they will later need towards their own patrons (Parliament, public 
opinion). But how satisfactory will be the results that come out of a system 
of M&E under construction? This does not seem to worry the donors unduly. 
In fact they seem to devote more attention to improving public expenditure 
management. This may be partly understandable as PEM is more linked to 
the ﬁrst phase of PRSP. Should this lack of urgent attention be considered 
as an indication that donors do not really take all that seriously the need to 
replace their own M&E systems with nationally owned ones? Does it mean 
that they do not really bother too much about outcomes but rather about aid 
spending ratios? Is this also why they accept that PRSP are remarkably silent 
on ‘evaluation’?  
15  Indicative  is  that  in  the  joint 
World  Bank-IMF  staff  assessment 
(JSA)  of  the  PRSP,  a  document 
produced prior to its discussion by 
the  Executive  Boards  of  the  two 
organizations, the section on M&E 
is  labelled ‘targets,  indicators  and 
monitoring’.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-02 • 33
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Annex 1  The questionnaire used for the desk study
  Topics Question
  I. Policy  
1 The evaluation plan Is there a comprehensive evaluation plan, indicating what to evaluate, why, how, for whom?
2 M versus E Is difference and relationship between M and E clearly spelled out?
3 Selection of indicators  Is it clear what to monitor and evaluate? Is there a list of indicators? 
4 selection criteria  Are the criteria for the selection of indicators clear? And who selects? 
5 Priority setting  Is the need acknowledged to set priorities and limit the number of indicators to be monitored?
6 Causality chain  Are different levels of indicators (input-output-outcome-impact) explicitly linked (programme theory)? 
(vertical logic)
7 Methodologies used  Is it clear how to monitor and evaluate? Are methodologies well identiﬁed and mutually integrated ?
8 Data collection  Are sources of data collection clearly identiﬁed? Are indicators linked to sources of data collection? 
(horizontal logic)
9 Autonomy & impartiality (accountability) Is the need for autonomy and impartiality explicitly mentioned? Does the M&E plan allow for tough 
issues to be analysed? Is there an independent budget? 
10 Feedback Explicit and consistent approach to reporting, dissemination, integration?
11 Alignment planning & budgeting Integration of M&E results in planning and budgeting? 
  II. Organization  
12 Coordination & oversight Appropriate institutional structure for coordination, support, central oversight, and feedback? With 
different stakeholders?
13 Statistical Ofﬁce Are surveys, censuses etc streamlined into M&E needs? Is the role of the statistical ofﬁce in M&E clear? 
14 Line Ministries M&E units in line ministries and semi-governmental institutions (parastatals), and properly relayed to 
central unit?
15 Decentralised levels M&E units at decentralised levels and properly relayed to central unit?
16 Link with projects Any effort to relay with/coordinate with donor M&E mechanisms for projects?
  III. Capacity  
17 Problem acknowledged Are current weaknesses in the system identiﬁed? 
18 Capacity building plan Plans for remediation? Training, appropriate salaries, etc.?
  IV. Participation of actors outside government 
19 Parliament Is the role of Parliament properly recognised, and is there alignment with Parliamentary control and 
oversight procedures?
20 Civil Society Is the role of civil society recognised? Are there clear procedures for the participation of civil society? Is 
the participation institutionally arranged or rather ad-hoc? 
21 Donors Is the role of donors recognised? Are there clear procedures for participation of donors?
  V. Quality (on the basis of Annual Progress Reports) 
22 Effective use of M&E in APR Presentation of relevant M&E results? Compared to targets? Analysis of discrepancies?
23 Internal usage of APR Is the APR also used for internal purposes? Is it an instrument of national policy-making and/or policy-
inﬂuencing and advocacy? 